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IN

TIUS PAWH~ET, the Germany of today is contrasted with the Germany of the days before World
War 1. It is the contrast of Germany under the
Hohcnzollern and Germany under Hitler, and the
substance of this contrast is the loss a£ liberty and
freedom in virtudly every aspect of ~ u b l i cand private life.
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When America entered the last World War, Dr.
Ahnm E. Taylor visited the countries of the Allied
and Associatad Powers as a member of the House
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Trade Board, he represented the United S t a t e on
questions of the food supply of the Allied and neutral countria as well as of the Central Powers, He
was a member of the Americrn delegation to the
International h n o m i c Conference in 1927 aad is
now director of research at General Mills, Inc. Dr.
Taylor is the author of many technical and popular
writings.
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GERMANY THEN AND NOW

I

N discussing chc objectives of the pwcnt war, social and
tconomic, the natural comparison is k w ~ demouacy
n
and che ideology of the Nazi government of Germany. W e
may accept ourselvs as "democratic," since Hitler has denounced us for democracy, and be has vied to difftrentiatc
Americans of German stmk from other Americans. Perhaps
equally significant is the difference between the Gummy of
t d a y and the Germany of an earlier period. There must Ix
thowands of Americans still living who studied in Germany
in the quarter century kforc the World War; most of t h e
Americans look back on their student days with plcarurr and
appreciation, certainly with grati tudc and possibly with m e t ence. Studutrs of painting a d scui urc went mostly to
France, Italy, and Greece; students o music preferrad Getmany. Students of the sciences went m d y to Germany, a
circumstance due partly to facilities of instruction but due also
to the indiffercnct toward foreign students then mmnt in the
universities of Great Britain and France. The writer entered
a German university in r e , and during the following two
decades enjoyed long and frequcnt visits there. He was attached to the American Embassy in Berlin in a tachnical capacity in 1916;he later surveyed the nutritional conditions in
Germany and Central Europe foliowing the war; and he has
since visit& Germany several times, the last time in 1937.
Without going into details or scatistical appraisals, the convast
btcwecn G m y under Hitler and Gumany under the
HohcneolIerns is marked perhaps more marked than the
mntrast in any other country, with the exception of Russia
and Turkey, within a puiod of a half century. Bctwccn 1 8 p
and 1940,Germany, Russia, and Turkey,for different r t a ~ ~ m ,
passed through internal revolutions, with changcs so extensive
and intensive as deeply to alter the social stmawe. These
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in Germany can be stated undu s e e d headings.

Germany before the World War had a rigid system of preliminary education (the Gymnasium) with a k i b l c system
of university education. 7 % student
~
was supposed to know
what be wished to study in the University. In thr routine conduct of university education in Germany, which had dtvel-

d i d y from M o m in smdl political units, students
and two minor subjects. Work in the major
subject mended from three to four years, including inteosive theoretical and practid applications; the final examination in the major subject was hard, but the thcgis was still
more important. One minor subject was usually related to thc
major subject -thus, a major in chemistry was often accomp i a d by a minor in physics. The work in the first minor
rubjcct was relatively intensive and usually had a bmring on
the major subject, but did not lead to a thesis. The second
minor subject was usually philosophy; it was d i 6 d t in some
universities and easy in others, according to the redilaaiom
of individual teachers. A student could sclcct tcac ers and the
length of puiod of i n s t d o n ; be could move from one uni-

"p"

c ectd a major

!I

versity to another, receiving creht for work previously done.
Expeascs wwc tow and mroiltd students enjoyed various
extraarridar privileges. The &ency
of this system of education was duc not merely to f d r n of election and dtction
and to high standards, but &o to fradom of insmaion.
ft is a s y at a distance and over the years to tlMggcrate the
&al side d studtat life -the Kommc~se,the Korpr. the
walking wurs and the unconventional simplicities of custom.
Under this system of education, a considerable numbtr of convivial students wasted £ram three to five years; a relativd
luge nvmtm worked to Jome p m m a ~advantage; n
number utilized the opportunities to thc fullest and becamethe
intellectual s&I
of Gumany, generation after peration.
Ah, many foreign students mid back to their cwnviw the
torches of Gtrmaa science and art. In the ninetics Gcrmany
was a Mecca for music lovers, with a profusion of opuas and
concerts at low prices of admission. A m u i w s occupied much

rmal;
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more than their share of the scats, but I never heard a German
rcscnt it. Nor were wc reprohtcd for being "democratic."
The recruiting of the teaching staff was donc under a mmpetitivc system, in effect. Aftcr aa ambitious German student
had taken his daaorate, he continued i n k v c spacidized
work for several ytars. H c then offered h M f as an instructor, a s ~ a l l t dPri~ocDo~cnr;upon being accepted by the
h d t y he bacamc a full-&dgd teacher. Promotion would
lead to what c a r r c ~ p d e dto an associate professorship; a final
promotion to full profwsorship. The Dozcntm and prof~ssors
ofired courses for which students paid fecs, which went to
the teachers themselves in large part; dl corn@ openly for
the favor of students and in the development of their subjects.
This fmdom fraqucndy led to violent polernics between men
in d i k t universities and indeed betweea colleagues on the
same faculty; but freedom it was, exceeded in few American
universities, all the more tKcausc the Rtctors changed every
year and did not serve long turns,as do presidmts of American universities.
Thc German university of today is a totally changed institution. On paper, in the institutions still remaining open
(there were once nearly thirty in the regions now indudcd
in the RJch) students f d o w the same routine. But freedom
of appointment, promotion, and reachinghas becn withdrawn.
A young man now desirous of h o m i n g a Dozcnt must not
d
y q d i f y in his specialty, he must also qudify in political
ideology; in fact he must pass an examhation in the Nazi
theory of the state. He must qualify in totalitarian -t.
There is high-grade mearch still king donc in German univvsitics d a y ; but the s y s t m of recruiting incomingtcachus
has bttn subordinated to political management by Ehe government. It is sometimes suggested that appointments to teachihg
staffs in state universities in the United States are under political influence; but if this is so, it is local and personal and not
ideological. There is no experience in American history which
can h compared with the changes of German educational
management under the Nazi government. There can bt no
uestion of the extreme change within thc hall etnnvy in the
Bi-ion of loss of frmiom by lea&= and nudenu. Universitics in the oc~upicdcountries are little betccr off.
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Under the Hohcnzollcrn dgime in Germany, t h e rights
were accorded with almost cht same frecdom and implications
as in the United States or Grcat Britain. There was such a
tbing as last majcsfl; but it applied especially to the person of
the Crown, and not to the institutions of the state. The writer
bas heard public politiml harangues in Germany as violent as
thoM ia Hydc Park in London, In the nineties, the cult of
socialism was quite fashionable; but cvur the strongat op
ponmts of s a d i s m were loath to lay hand upon frccdom of
p m 9 s p c h , or a%ernHy. Mail was not censored. Thue were,
of course, instanca ofndusion-Karl Marx left G c m p to
compose hs
i works in the security and dusion of England.
Foreigners rcsidcnt in Gumany possessed unusua! freedom,
unhampered by more than nominal registration with the
police. Germans moved a b u t with freedom, from one state
to another and from one occupation to another; tht Wan&lust was unratrainad, of which the emigration of vcnturcsome millions furnished ample illustration.
In the present Germany, there is no right of free assembly,
fm speech, free press, or of free movement. Criticism by
speech is severely punished; even listening to a foreign radio
broadcast is forbidden. Mail is censored. The pms is noi only
wnuolkd, it is literally edited from a mntral bureau. Public
m b l a g e is unknown, except whcn &ally calkd for thc
purpose of prearranged approval of the government Movement from one part of the country to another, or even from
one vocation to another, is not a permitted right; emigration
is under control, and limited mostly to dcsplcd Jms.Since
inhabitants are economic units, they are resvaintd like bills
of exchange. Censorship exists to the length of complctc sup
prcssion of freedom of public expression -or private txprce
sion as controlled by the * t a p ,
the sEEm police. It is true
that the present miriaions a& more severe dince declaration
of war in Scptunber 1939 than previously; but fmdoms enjoyed prior to the World War were withdrawn by the Nazi
dgirnc as mas it tmk power, five years before the dedaration of the present war. The beam of the liberals of Ger-
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many republican govunment under the formality of monarchy has k n s h a d .
More important today'than the printed pa& is the spdrta
word, iu broad-.
Amuimns, howmu, must bear in mind
that e o n of receiving instruments is very much more
common in the United Stat= than in any European country;
&&re,
che radio as an instrument of propaganda and disseminator of news and public opinion is here more pramincot
than in Europt. It is fair to say that at pmcnt in t& United
Statcs the bmdcastcd word has more oublic influam than
the printed page; but the oppsik is vul in Germnny. Nevwthdms, on account of the elusiveness of the broadcastcd ward.
and the possibility of dmlatiw by eollcctian of private
audientcg (so to s p k ) the radio is of large importance in
Europe. At the same h e , no German listens to Hider as
casually as many of us listen to the Fircsidc Chats; and no
member of the American Congress or cabinet is accordtd the
attention given to a member of the E l i ~of the Nazi p r t y .
Thcre is nJther frm broadcast nor fra mciving in Garmany,
nor is there in Russia or Italy, In Germany, a mega& Englishman regularly broadcasts to Great Britain in the English
language, counting on freedom of reception in Great Britain;
but the use of receivers to pick up broadcasts from foreign
cwntrics is prohibited in Germany. Thut are ofticially conducted broadcasts in Germany, dealing with war news and
p r o p a p d a and especially directed to the small powers surrwndlng Germany. The Guman government even fears infiltrations from neutral Sweden and Switzerland, since press
reports and broadcasts in those cwntrics have been protc8eed
when deemed inimical to Gcnnany. Negative censorship is
bad, but directed propaganda is worse. Since Germans cannw
know how outsiders regard their government, they art unable to realize the outside feeling -that the prcsmt German
government is n recession f m political civilization.
The Germans are a highly cultivated race, praaically without illiteracy; the Russians are an ignorant race with a high
percentage of illituacy. But the samt fact holds, that no one
in the outside world can know what the people in Germany
and in Russia redly think about their own affairs or their
relations with the outside world. Thus, dection is impsible.
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Germany under the Hohcnzollerns enjoyed an active political life. The conservative party was opposed by the often
larger "proletarian" prtics -h a 1 democrats and d c d
liberals. The Catholic prty (the Centnun) had the most stationary representation in the Rcichstag, and s u p p o d lmth
conservatives and IihraIs on occasion. The several parties had

their political sheets, which in editorids and in hmdlincs
demonstrated freedom of proposal and criticism. There was
freedom of political parties in the Rcichstag and active o p p i tion in debate. One of the treats in Berlin in the last century
was to listen to attacks on Bismarck by liberals like Virchow

and Richter.
Today the tntirt press of Germany is negatively controlled
d pitivcly directed by a propaganda bureau
of the government. Newspapers arc literally billboardp; cutain papers are dose to Hider and Gotring, others to von
Ribkntrop and Ha;apparently von Schacht has no p m
and makes his own noise. In any event, them is no indc
pendent editorial criticism; nor is them independent publication of news, since all news is given out or censored by the
political bureau. This situation is equalled only in Russia,
since even in Italy and Japan there are said to be traces of an
independent press left. When one considus the vigor, indcptndence, and d e n t that used to adorn the issues of the
Berliner TugcbIaH and the Frankjurter ZCit~ngfor exampIc,
the degradation of the press under the Nazi system becomes
glaring. There can be no plitical freedom without a free
pms, and no free press without political freedom -and in
the present Germany (wen before the war) both have been
extinguished. In short, there can be no freedom far Germany
without freedom for Germans, which has been lost.
One of the aversions of Hitler s e a s to bt that in the United
Stam immigrants live in a "melting-pot: whereby a common
typc of "American" is turned out in the second generation.
HitIer dislikes Amcrica became he fears this country may try
to democratize the outside world; he dislikes us also because
this country has drmocratid millions of Germans who since
the Civil War have migrated to and settled in this country,
by the police a
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and who with their descendants are loyal and integrated mrmbtrs of our A c t y . C h c to ten million Americans have German M d , on which Hider would like to count for eventual
support for his "new order" in Europe, -the policy that a
race is to bE made into a nation, not a nation made from the
mingling of races. But our immigrant^ were "high-graded."
Mass migration rather than assimilation is the Nazi rule.

In Germany under the Hohenzollcms, workers had the
right to organize: thcy could strike and make contraca with
cmploycrs covering wa
and conditions of work. Workus
could alx, form p o l ~kt ~ r
parties. In some respects, workers at
that time were as w d o r g a n i d in Germany as in Great
Britain and in many ways better organized than in the United
Statcs. Workers' organizations in Germany were in dose cantact with those in the surrounding industrialized countries,
and had close international connections.Germany was then an
importer of seasonal labor, especially farm workcrs; rhcse
migrations were under Local rather than fcdual wntrol. To an
extent greater than in Great Britain, urban workers were
adherents of socialism, and the poIicies of Bismarck t o k account of this circumstance.
Under the Nazi system, lab has lost freedom; labor
unions ate closed and political afiiliations abolished. There is
no right of collective hgaining; w a p arc set by the government, to some extent under the inAuenct of industrial leaders.
The h o u r "Labor Front" of Ley, very c f f d v t for loyal
adherents, has for others h e same latitude shown to the
members of a chain-gang on outside prison work. Migration
of Iabor into and out of Germany is undcr federal state contrd
and regulated by force. This d m holds fax the imprisoned
state, who have lost their own and German hccdan.
Thus, a half century of "class struggle" by workmen for
independence and organization has bccn crastd. Pwibly nwhere in the world, even in Russia, arc workers more controlled in r a p t to hours, wages, movuncnt, and type of

.
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work--since it is a fundamental doctrine thatthere is no dividing lm k t w e m dviEan and military vocations. H w d h d a f t , Wckrwirtsch~tand Kricgm'r~~tkajt
are +ad
in
time and space, i n t c p t d by the state. The mistake was ma&
in the beginning of Italian and Gcnnan concentration d
acmromic powu, of assuming that it was anti-labor; it has
since h
e dear that the changs wcre both anti-labor and

-

mti-upid not anti-Mshevic but pdictator. Worktro'
syndicates pusist in Italy, however.

Under the Hoheodtrn dgime in Gemany, capital was

in most rcspaas as free in initiative as in Great Britain and
France, at a time when we dmdy bad laws designed to
maintain "competition" by prohibiting ''conspiracy in rtstraint of trade." Capitalists in Germany were permitted wide
latitude, which found t x p i o n q c c d y in a d s , somt
internal but many international. It was alleged on behdf of
capital that workers' danaods provoked organidon of industrialists, while on the & hand it was alleged that wncmtration of industrialists made organization of w o r k s
-tial;
but in m y event, freedom of organization cxistcd on
both sides. Thut was a nominal c o n l by thc state, c s p a i d y
in mpct of international d s . Under this system of free
eaarprise, German industrialists and banks uadbd in many
distant countries, where the combination of quality of mcr&andisc and long-term credits was effective in stcuring fartip &, especially for new lines of goods. In the laa twenti* German industrialists came to this country to look u
our "new UP.**They f w d much to Iin mass pi
tion, but not in distribution. That Amerians would makc
loam to Gumans to cum out goods to corn c with o w ,
never lou for them the spell of Alice in WonGand.
At presmt, capital is in drains in Germany. Many of the
ca 'dim have disappred. Jewish capitalists have ather
or ate i.concenmrioa amp;but mnog purebloodad German cppitalists, Pkt Thysen, have left Gtrmaay.

S
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It is commonly stated that tht "stcel magnat-" originally sup
p o d Hitltr to ust him against labor unions -only later to
k ahsorbed by thc totalitarian government. But in any event,
the government now &ermina USES of tapid, rat- of interat and dividends, profits, and the type of w c ~ kto which
capital is applied. In foreign trade, the previous free export of
Gtnnan 4
s and services is now entirely under governmatt
bumus. In controt of foreign exchange and physical movcrnent into forcign trade, the government possessed a power not
known prior to t k World War.
Just what have been the monetary gains and l o w d
workers of labor and of capita1 rcspmtivdy, is not dear;
apparently, labor has obtained security at a lowm income
level whik capital has obtained security by splitting profits
with the state. But in any event, freedom of capita! has disappeared, just as has frtadorn of labor; and, therewith, conflict bccween capital and labor. Maax has been vindicated
negatively. Whcntver a decision has been made by the raponsible (and iafallible) prty ltadcrs, this is accepted as ex
cathedra by investors and workers just as it w a s in the
building of missions in California by native Indian labor
under the Spanish padres. Profits b
e savings for the state.
Control of l a h r and capital means control of gmda and
services and thcir prices, and of coum control of the standard
and plane of living. Whenever Gumans inquire why thcy
have a lower plane of living, thc status is fim txtcnuated as
"exaggeration based on pmonccived standards"; then they art
told that they arc "ptponing consumption from the present
to the future"; that the policy makes Getmans secure -in
part through making non-Gumans instcure. T h e diet, clothing, and household hrnishings of Germany contain surprising amounts of E~SBCI
-which has had the inevitable effect
of introducing Ersaz into commercial morality. In any went,
the Germans are d d that whatever the plan of living (cleverly
devised), this is applied evenly to all, whereas (aver and over
again are quoted the words of our President) in the United
Stam onerhird of the population is underfed, undtrdothed,

-

and undcrhwsd.

The final test of the Nazi system Iics in foreign trade; the
field of foreign markets wilI be the Armageddon of the
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struggle btcwecn totalitarian and demoeratic governments.
Here the Germans have ftlt forced to Imve their traditional
vantageground of technical cxaeIlencc of products and have
attempted a revolution in international finance. This has ken
done through c o n d of value of German money, rat= of

foreign exchange, bartu under "daring agrmnmts," and
fixing of import and urpon prices without reference to cats.
A dear view of contrast betwetn foreign trade by govc~nment
and foreign tradc by private enterprise may be had by comparing an authoritative German book by M q e r on Andysis
of Exchange Resm'ctions
Prcrcnt in I;otce with W d d
Economy i~ Transirion by Staky, and Rcconsrwion of
Wwld Trade by Condlifie. In the perusal of such literature it
is to be kept in mind that any sysfcm adopted for foreign
tradc reversibly involve domestic mdc and tends to become
one of the determinants thereof. When Geman writers speak
of the "new order," they include in this program, as perhap
the most important single element, the control of foreign tradc
by smtt planning, instead of dcvdoprnent of foreign marketing by privare enterprise. Aim, in the "new order" are various
impitions on imparting states, to be appIied through onc or
anather form of terrorism by totalitarian states, as has been
done in Eastern Europe in recent prewar p r s .
in the tactics of totalitarian strategy, force begins where
economic rcssure fails; seizure of country is made when
necessary or control. Having seized Norway and Denmark,
Hitler may feel ht is d
Ion the way of attaining a pet (verbal) ambition of Bismarck to unite Scandinavia with Germany to form "a league strong enough to rule the whole
world."

!

In Germany under the Hohcnzollems, the various political
units of population had ekient police systems of the d d a
type, for maintenance of public order and suppression of
crimc, not political direction of the populace. Without qucs
tion, the I m p d Chancery had m e sort of cspionap organization, especially u&
in forcign affairs, which sometimw was in evidence in controlling the spread of socialism.

'3
But for che most part, &re tht World War, it cwld have
been said fairly that the police system of Germany was as unpolitid and honest as tbat of G m t Britain, and both more
capable and h w t tban thost of France and the United
States. At that time, only Russia bad a widcspmd systcm of
secret police which had long served the Romanoffs. The hdinavian countries and the other small muntrics around Germany did nut m a i n t a ~such secret N i c e or forcign cspionagc.
At ~ m mGermany
t
has tht most elaborate dwdo~mentof
sccmt'police ever knokn. T h e secret
ict of the ~;lmanofFs
was reorganized under h i n , and a h t c d under Stalin;
thus the OGPU had traditions. But the Gestapo of Germany
is a new creation of thE Hitlcr d g h e . I t operates at home and
abroad, puhaps even in the U n i d Stam. A oct is thrown
over the cntirc domcstic public, whose opinions, ucpressiams,
and movements arc studied. If a German h e n s to a broadcast horn abroad, picks up a pampbl~dropped by an English
@me, or reads a foreign news per, this is set down in his
record. The Gestapo checks aIl abor agitation, dl a t t u n p at
mival of workers' unions. It arrangts for transfer of workmen, u n l a this is done under uniformed militia. It is believed that pressure has bten placed on German subjects,
csptcidy Jews and other non-Tcutons, to influence relatives
and financial connections in foreign co.mtrits. The &tap
can place any one in a concentration camp, on suspicion and
without trial.
At prescot the Gwapo is almost as ubiquitous in Norway,
Denmark, Wgium, Holland, France, Portugal, and Spain as
it is in Germany. Indeed it might not be amiss to surmise that
the Gestapo is secretly operating in Italy and Russia; and
quite certainly it has rcprcscntativcs in the United Sratcs. The
hand may be gloved, but not always. T h e psibility of sod a d "fifth column" movements d e p d s upon e x d o n of
Gestapo influence into foreign countries. From the standpoint
of rhe common man, this is prohably the greatest mtrast in
C a m a n y k w ~ the
n pmworld War and the present the
dative freedom from police interference then, and the mmpietc wntrd by poIice now. The Ovra of Italy is dedasst.
GERMANY TIU5M AND NOW
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Under this term is meant coaccatratioa in camps or uecution of political opponents, Political assassination of owrse
has always misted, of which a number of unique illustrations
are given by Btrtrand Russell in his book Poww. But such
assassinations wcre usually b e by individuah or small
groups, negatively rcvdutionary or positively patitical. Thus
the assassination of Prince Ferdinand by a clique of Serbians
started (the politicians into starting) the World War; later, a
Czar of Russia was assassinated; alter the war, there were conspicuous assassinations of Kurt Eisncr, Rosa Luxrmburg,
and Walther Rathenau. Such instances, however, were political assassinaticlos, not purges.
The purge was ap rently organized in Russia, more for
the p u r p of "puriR:ng" the revolutiony party in pwu
than for the p u p of r m v a l of oppition outside of the
revolutionary party. It has been perfected undcr Stalin, in
some casts with the added public gesture of spectacular trial
bdorc hand-picked juries, with dcctcd charges-the
prisoners pleading guilty in alitged conftssions which could
hardly have hen spontaneous. Such trials have in &cct been
a form of intellectual sadism, or possibly an occidental form of
&are-&i. T h e purges in Italy wcre occasional occurrcnaes,
p h a p under the doak of incendiariam, appareotly done far
the p u r p c of removal of opponents d fascism, rather than
for the purification of the company of fascists. (It is probably
over-simplification to assume that the word "purge" was
drawn from the administration of eastoroil to political o p p ents in the early days of Fascism in Idy.)
Thc G m a n purges, which began not Ion after Hitltr
came to power, were apparently organized trot for puriEicatim of the Nazi party and for elimination of opposition outside of the party. The Nazis did not copy the Russian prac
ticcs of fake public trials; apparently that did not a p p l to
the dramatic instinct of Germans as it did to Russians, who
had been (so to speak) raised on terror kids in popular 5ction. The number of persons who were informally extcuPcd
in the purges in Germany is, of course, unknown. Purges in
Balkan smtes have on occasions &en the form of mass sui-

-

-
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ddc, "on recommendation;' like scppuka. For strategic rmsons, pwges arc concentrated; thus for Germany, June 30,
1934, was the Saint Bartholomew's Eve.
A minor form of purge is the mnctntration camp, h these
amps are herded all kinds of political opponents; of ~ w r s c ,
also, racial undesirables and industrial obbtructionists. On occasions, obstreperous clergy are thus confined. To some extent
the concentration camp is used as a sweating chambu, to
=re
information from exhausted inmates; to somt extent it
is a farm of punishment, to last the life of the inmate. No
previous public position or social status s&e
to rtsetlc
marked men from concentration camps, which contain some
of the intellectual Itaders of pst-World-War Germany.
The purge and the concentration camps arc mcrcly two instruments of the Gestapo, whereby ttrrorism is disscminawd,
political obcdimct exacted, and enforcement of economic
policies facilitated,--GeitapI;tv, the new order of zht concentration camps.

It is impossible for an outsider to makc adequate comment
on this phase of German Iifc. in Germany before the World
War, Lutheran and Catholic churches stood side by side,
relatively in peace and cosperation-all the more striking
when one recalls that Luther amsc in Germany. In same German states, the Lutheran creed reprtscnted a state religion, in
others the Catholic creed r t p m t e d a state religim, in fact
if a& by d m . In any event, the religious Fife of the p p l e
and the religious instruction of the growing generation were
free from governmend restraint or dimtion throughout Gtrm v .

N ~ Germany
W
has become irreligious in a sense totally
foreign to that country. According to Rosaberg, the historical
concept of "ntgauvc" Chrissianity is to lx changed into a
" p i ~ v e "Christianity of race, blood, soil, and Itader. Thc
various organizations of youth, such as The SumgthThrough-Joymovement, have both the design and tbc effect
of removing adokents from the control of parents and
churchcs. In this manner, Germany begins training in the
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Nazi system in earIy chidhood; possibly it is this o b j d v e ,
rather than revolt against religion itself, that has led to
the intransigent attitude toward established churches. Thc
Lutherans, of course, are helpless; but the Catholics still have
an cxtcrnd appeal to the Vatican and to Cathdic support
over the world. When one recalh that for centuries Germans
fought for che right to teach children a digion based on conscience, the present factual irreligion is indeed a striking
change, This is a corporeal realization of a phrase of Gladstone "the negation of God erected into a system of government." As Max Eastman IM
remarkd, "When historians
look back, I Miwe the fading of religious faith in this era
will seem a chid explanatory kctor of its madness."

-

No-

Oblige

Whatever dse might have been said of the noble families
which reigned over German states, ~ p c i a l l yPrussia and
Bavaria (me Prowrant, the ather Catholic), the fact r&
that these aristocrats had high social breeding md superior
personal instincts. NoMesse oblige was taught to successive
gcncrations; since the king, prince, or duke was, for the most
part, abmt the law, he was taught to have pride in acting in a
manner worthy of such exemption. Thus, for a century lxfore
the World War from Frederick the Great to Kaiser Wilhdm I -German rulers were leaders in cultural and social
imprwunmts, though not always in the same sense leaders
in political and emnomic ameliorations. In short, troblcssc
obligc was the rule of action. Of this one h
n
id
s many historical
illustrations, -a rather amusing one being the refusal of the
King of Pruwia ta accept, as part of his domain, the Duchies
d Schltswig-Holstein conquered from Denmark by Prussia and Austria and off& to the king by Bismarck - because "be had no right to them."
Of n&cssc obligt in the leaders (elite) in National Socialism ia Gcrmany, there is no outward sign. The attitude is one
of intolerance, harshness, oppression, and cruelty. The terrorism of the Gestapo extends down from the top; from the beginning, their actions have bEEn an outstanding expmsion of
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Mein Kampf. When one contrasts the public lives of the
members of the royal German h o w , with h e public attitude
of the icadcts of the Nazi dgimc, the difference between
posxssion and lack of ~oblcsseobligr becomes apparent.
According to early associa- of Hider, he dreamed
forwards and backwards. Himself an Austrian (supposedly),
from tfit history of the Hapburp he could have learned not
Mtlity but intrigue. Having much of the spirit of the Carly
Saxons, it may k inferred that he mites to himsdf the stories
of Charlemsgne, Otto the Great, and Barbarma. He manblcs neither King Frederick tbe Great nor Emperor Wilhdm
lI. Most of all, in spirit if not in details, he rcstmblcs Gcnghis
Kban. But one diffcrcncc seems dear: an economic Geaghis
Khan is even mom ominous than a territorial Gmghis Khan.

In the feudal age, subdivisions of population had geographiml origins; when the Germans emerged from the Middle
A p , they a p p ~ as
d smdlcr "states," more or less independent, in surprising number considering the population involved. The advent of protestantism in North Germany had
some eEm in increasing such subdivisions. The history of
the German-speaking peopl~sis one of variously-sought but
never-attained cansolidation, until Hider. The Hapsburgs to
the East and the Prussians to the North strove for mastcry;
occasionally there appeared a South G t m n i e movement.
Surprising diflerenccs in language persisted in the different
Gumanic units stiI1 mist in vernaculars in fact -exaggerated by church di rcnccs. (Americans will recall differcnces in constmetion and pronunciation in San Francko,
New Orleans, Philadelphia, and Boston; also the variations in
slm.9.)
B~smarckiccrcated a German Empire in the nin.ct#n&
rentury. He found that the so-called "War of Liberation" had
accomplished nothing in the direction of unification. I n his
view German unity had been buried in the Federation at
FranIdurt by Mettemich; h e "movtmcnt of liberstion of
1848" had mme to naught but rcformulariom of local in-.
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It was at this h e that Bismarck m d e d traits that have reappeared in Hider. In an o&ial politid spmh as early as
1851, he remarked: "The only g m d reason why a great smte
goes to war is egotism and not romanticism, being thereby
distinguished from a small srate." And once thereafter, Gut
Prokesch-Osten, Premier at Vienna, remarked that "Herr v.
Bismarck dadarts that Prussia is the center of the world"
B i s m a ~ kexpanded Prussia by seizure northward, by conquest
westward, and by consolidation centrally; eastward he sought
an aliianm, but not absorption. Bismarck in 1866 provoked a
war "without -on"
against Austria {which he disliked).
Ocfrated by supcrior military equipment, Auaria, in the form
of the later Austria-Hungry, foIlowing the AusgICich in 1867,
becvne the firm ally of Germany, - a striking achievement
of Bismarck. In the war with Austria, it turned out to k
necessary for Prussia to oppose Bavaria, Saxony, and other
small states and defeat them with Austria. Tbis defeat, however, in a paradoxical manner, led to revival of Germanic consciousntss, so that when the FranaPrussian War was conduded (another victory by supuior quipmem) with transfer
of h e and Lorraine to Germany, the German stam were
u n i d in an empire headed by the king of Prussia- in this
sense a Pax Gcrmmica. The new Gumany concluded with
the new Austria-Hungary an alliance which rcpmented by
far the largest area and population ever under control by a
Teutonic political power. Remarkable as was this poIitid
consolidation by Bismarck, it n d s to k kept in mind that it
remained for Hider to absorb Austria and Bohemia, divide
Poland for the nth time, and create a Westmsrk out of AhccLorraine. Abo, to imprison Norway, Denmark, Holland, and
Bdgium.
Befort thc World War, Gttmany contained wer twenty
more or less autonomous political units, which had inherited
and cultivated intra-racial antagonisms, usually petty but
somctimcs deep. Thc main internal blocs were Pmssia, Saxony, Bavaria, Wurternkg and Badcn -usually Pntssia had
to fact the combined oppition. Thae intra-German antaganisms were dearly, sometimes ludicrously, in evidence in the
universiticr: the Schwabm were ridiculed, the Saxons mimicked, the Bavarians caricatured, the lowlanders reviled by tire
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hiflanders. In the ninetia, the common namc for Prussians
in-hvaria was Sau-pews. Everywhere was antagonism of
che "Big Germans" by the "Lictle Germans."
AII this Hider has changed. He absorbed the fragments of
Austria-Hut kary, morselated by the trcatiw of pee. Ab
sorbing Austria and Czcchoglovakia (as 'irrdcortd") into the
Third Rcich, the Nazis proceeded to destroy ccnturidd
particularism by erasing old state and provineid lints and
dividing the country into administrative units called "Gau."
Thus Hider did what neither Hapsburgnor Hohcndern had
tried; he created a harsh national spirit out of many varietia
of soft local spirits. Soon the dialects will disappear, since
songs like "Worst W d will not Ix sung in dialects. (Even
Hitlcr has learned to speak high German, instead of an
Austrian dialect.) Such a change had to lxgin with children;
in another gemation, onIy grandparents will recall songs ~ n d
s t o r k in dialect and vcmacular. Problematical pcrhrps is tbe
duration of Austrian absorption; though the Austrian Tyr*
Icst are Iike tbost of Bavaria, Vienna r u n a h a proud old city
and the Prwsians may yet have to cxpcriaict a new meaning
for the oId boast "Der Wicnm geht met untcr." In the light of
a thousand years of history, this unification of spirit and gwgraphy is the largest achievement of the Nazi dgime. It has, of
course, no inherent comectim with the Nazi philosophy of
state; but the fact remains that ody under this exttemc form
of totalitarian statism was unikation accomplished. G e m m y
was an Urvdk, had U r b l and
~ an Urspachc the "Nordic
unity" of race, blwd, language, and soil. Unpropagandal
It is noteworthy that the greatest & d i n g of art in the
history of Germany -in Goahe and SchiIler, Mozart and
&ahoven -was in a period of low political status of the
German states. And rhe music dramas of Richard Wagner
were completed mostly before the tstlblishmcnt of the Empire
following the France-Pmian War. But tht philosophers of
statism (Fichte, Hegel and N i e t d e ) , the historians of a
tism (von Treitschke, von Bemhardi, Rosenbcrg), and the
planners of war (von Clauscwitz and von Schik&n) sprang
from, and contributed to, the growth
of the spirit and form
ofthe absolute smc.
To understand Mcia Kampf, directly and in contrast, one
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must have read The Ptiucc and the Disc~ursesofMachiavelli,
the Spir't of tkc Laws by Moatcsquitu, and the dispatches
and writings of Mcttemich. That the untutored Hider knew
thcsc works when he first wrote Mcin Kampf seems impossible; but the same art of inmigut was there. The various
historical shapes and sizes of lust for power have been assembled in a novd presentation in the P o w of Btrtrand Russell.
One wonders: when Hider reads The Prime and Mussolini
reads M& Kampj, do they have the same thoughts?

Before the World War, tht commercid and culturat d a tions of Gumany to the other European countrim, outside d
Russia, were on the whole bmcr than might have bcw expacted from rcvious history. During this period Germany
w a s technical y thc most rapidly advancing European counuy, with due rapact to many high points in ocher countries.
Following rilgo through trains wcrc devdopcd and tourists
vavdled with little delay, on passports that did not rquirc,
outside of Russia, a gmt deal of information. (In any evcnt,
brikry at frontiers was my.) Goods mwed freely, since import tariffa were practidy the only impediments to trade. In
the commerce of Europe at this time comparative advantage
was conspifilousIy the rule of action. The volume of interEuropean foreign trade expanded in pmpwtion to total production. On the whole, d wages were rising, production
costs falling, and fmd suppliw and raw materials from overseas btcame avaihbie in increasing amounts. It was on this
aceount that nm-political observers regretted the Bare-ups in
international politics, which thrmtened to cut short a period
of expanding &vclopmcnt, not scriouslg disturbed in the 'go's
by he depression which was severe in tht United States. Cutainly over this quarter century, the attitude of Germany war
"give and take" in matters of track, intercourse, cimtlatian of
press, and freedom of forcign c x c ~ g c ,
Relations with particular countries muit attention. Getmany had cordial political and commercial relatiom with the
Scandinavian countries, which cwntrics had to a wnsidcrablc

P

G E W Y THEN AND

MOW

31

extent @c&r
technical dcvclopments. Thm defuweha
countries received from Germany the s a m e mnsidcratiw in
commercial afFairs which they received from Great Britain
and the United St-,
with whom they traded frcdy. Quite
similar were the rdarioas with S w i t x r h d , Holland, and
Belgium --countries that had highly devdoped mechard4
techniques in metals and fibres. Thc fact that the Swiss, with
three languagw, dcaIt freely and without p m u r e with CWmany, France, and Italy, was regarded as ~lmahingmerely
natural and not an astonishing illustration of nciahborlincss.
German trade with the
including ~ussia,-&s largely
an exchange of manufactured @for agricultural rpw mlrerials. But throughout this time, the grains and other p d u a
of Eastem Europe and Russia competed with those from overseas on a c i f . basis of price and gmde. Certain grins fm
the Black &a went by preference to England, others to France
and Germany for illustration, Frana and Gumany would
accept wheat with admixtures of rye which was not desired in
the United Kingdom. CMainly these Hinterland countries
regarded themselves as indcpmdmt agricultural states, just as

E~SZ
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did - h a

and A w d i a .

The trade relations with Britain, Frana, and Italy wcrc
active, d d n g h o m e r the expanding development of technology in Gmnany. Disregarding the Unitcd S t a t e thew
four countries looked upon each other ar favored custom^.
It was in this pwiod that the words "Made in G m m n y "
acquired inrunatimal currency, though much more used in
new markets overseas than in the older mark& of Europe.
The litical re!ationships t h e m e comment. With the dedine o the influence of Bismarck and the incmse in i n h cndt of vm Tirpitz and othcr advisers of Empew Wilhtlm
Tl, occurred a shih in attitude towards Russia. The traditional
opinion had been that friendship betwem Rwsia and Germany wss a " n a d friendship!' The ruling hwses were
friendly, by intermarriage and in d i c y . Rwsia did not fear,
nor did Germany then desire, expansion in the Ukraine; on
the other hand, Gumany rook grim pfaure in the prosof Russian pressure on British India via A f g h h m . It was
recognized that union of h m y with Aubttia-Hunpry
d hst in Guman eastern d i c v and chat continuous &
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mtion for Panslavism might disturb relations h v c c n

Ger-

many and Russia. If we interpm the murder of Prince Fraaz
Ferdinand at Scrajevo as a misguided act of Panshvism, this
t a r turned out to be justified. Germany,while fully suppwting Austria-Hungary in control of Serbian politid activity,
then and since believed that the World War could have been
prevented if the foreign ministers of Russia and Austria-Hungary had so desired. An alliance k t w e m Russia and Francc
was exptcted and meant little; but the success of Edward VII
in inducing Great Britain to rooperate with this Alliance was
a shock to Germany, since it indicated the end of the traditional pdicy of friendship of Russia for Gumany.
German relations with Italy were complacent but m n descending. Germans did not like italirns and Italians disliked G e m s , as was evident in the behavior of touristp in
both countries. Germany had no resptct for Italy as a military
power on land or a naval power at sea. When Italy joined
Germany and Ausuia in the Triple AUiancc, this was regarded as something with a "nuisanct" value, since it relieved pressure MI Austria fmm the Adriatic, thus enabling
Austria to devote morc attention to the Russian side. At the
same time, it was commonly felt in Germany that if it came to
a p r a l war, the support of Itaiy could not be counted on,
since obviously she stood to gain by trading with both sides.
When, therefore, Italy entered the war against the Central
Powus, and subsequently the contracts as mcaled in the
Treaty of London wcre made public, no one in Germany was
surprised. If one will take the press of Germany (a) in the
'pb, { b ) at the outbreak of the World War, (c) following
desertion of the Triple Aliiance by Italy, ( d ) during the peace
negotiations, and ( c ) at present, thc contrast between the tone
exhibited toward Italy now and previously is almost unbe
licvable, since to Italy is now ascrihd virtues in number
and importance which then no German bclievd existed in
Italians at all.
The relations with France wcre naturally strained following
her unexpectedly sudden defeat in 1871. To some went, of
course, the Belgians were involved, since they were always
regarded, men in treaties, as exposed to German invasion.
The von SchIieffcn plan for attack on France by invasion of
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3clgium was understd in wcll-informed Jrdes during the
H o d ktwthe Franco-Prussiaa and the WorId War;
&&re,
when Germany invadcd Belgium p r d y without notice in rgq, no one was surprised. The Gemam b
lieved that France would bi& her h e , as she had d m rep t e d l y ovcr h e centuries; the Fmch believed that mnc
day thg would recapcure Alsace and larraine, and the statue
of Suasbourg in Paris gave evidence of this abiding faith. In
taking ovcr Ahwe and Lnrraine, Bismarck tried to s t c all
~
the iron-oie deposits; but ae~ocdingto gossip, his g d o g h
wcrc c d a , so that France was not entirely &privcd ofh
ore. Nevertheless, the possession of the h a h e o m , w
gether with import from Spain and Sweden, alleviated grcatly
the diliicultics of the Gcrman steel industry, dqmdent ~a
low-percentage ort in Germany.
The psscssion of donits by France, Holland, BeIgium,
and Great Bri& gave them definite advantap in thdr
trade with Germany, since
munuis thus # vdw
able supplies of many indispensabfe materials like tin and
mbk.
Politid relations between Germany and Grtat Britain had
been on the whole free and cooperative since the Napo!conic
wars, when together Prussia and England op@
Bonaparte.
Up to the dose of the curtury it was Great Britain's policy to
avoid long-term Continental commitments, in order to be free
to act in one diraaioa or another in m e of emergency. Britain
had an old fear of Russia invading India through A f g h a h m .
She had no fear of Gumany u d the "large navy party"
arose. Bctwtcn 18cp and 1915, a succcssiom of acts by Germany undermined the old relations. The Gumaa supof
the Bars in the South African war, her ostcnmtiws su port
f1. Spin in the war with the United States, together w i t the
behavior of her € k tin Philippine waters, and the incident of
Agadir were dearcut illuswtions. Impctlllism was c x p d ing. Then arose motivated propaganda D?a#g-n#ch~~tm,
Berlin-Bagdad, Deutdhnd iibcr &s am M m ,the continuous agitation ovcr rhc "unn&"
donial poascssions of
Grtat Britain and France (and Holland and Belgium ,the
p h a d o n of h e young lipLcr k t "the htum
many l i upon the water" -all these things, which sprang
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not from the common p p i e but from propaganda, were disturbing to statesmen in Great Britain. An alliance bawccn
Russia and France was, of course, expected and had ao mean'ing for the time being; when however, Britain became friendly to the Franeo-Russian alliance, this gave to the allianct an
added import. At the same time, the Germans did not take
British annoyance seriously, and at the opening of the World
War it was not bdicvcd by the papulatian in Germany that
England would declare war in support of Wgium. When
this was done, it provoked the comment from the Wilhemstrassc, that so long as Europe had two war camps -Francs
Russian and the Triple Alliance- with Great Britain demchcd, no general war could occur; but so s c ~ mas Britain
became anached to either side, general war became inevitable.
The Germans resented the blockadc of foodstuHsfs,and this
was always called the "English Starvation Plan." Each extension of submarim warfare was portrayed as provoked by
British violations of international law. The circumstance that
a h the entrance of the United States the AUied and Associated Powers rationed the neutral countries around Germany
always provoked in Germans an in~omprehensibltdegree d
rage. At the same time the Germans formally announcod the
rule that 'hccessity knows no law."
After the World War,- in what may be called the
war period, the t m t p years from 1919ta 1939-trade

interconditions h
n Germany and her near and distant ncighbws
changed significantly. This was duc t a r d y to the develop.
meat of "economic nationalism," to depreciations of cumncics, rcvaluarions and withdrawals of gold, control of foreign
exchange and the gradual develo mtnt of barter. (It may not
M ~ m
I rema* that during
u m e mag yeu.t n d e
restrictions at state borders devcloped in a significant number
of the forty-eight states in the United States, rcstriclions unheard of before the World War.) In these dwtlopmu1ts of
economic nationalism and haner trade, minority prtssures
within countries and weight of numbers betcountries
became ominous. Evcn W o e the advent of Hider, the democratic government of Germany felt itself forced into such tactics, which had baome common, and had led to Empire
prefcrcnct in thc trade of the United Kingdom. The pre
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viwsly amicable exchange of g d s and services bcnvwr
Germany and the small countries around her SwitztrIand,
Bdgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden
btcame entangled. Thc fact that several ofthese countria joined
the *'sterlingarca" was repugnant to Gumany; her financiers
were unable to explain why there was no "mark area" corresponding to 'kterling area." (Apparently, however, men as
early as in the 'ao's, financial I e a h in Gumany were planning a "mark area.") Gradually exchange of particular macerials, raw or finished, or strvicts, came more and more under
control. The Incunational Economic Conference of 1917 and
various meetings held under the auspices of the League of
Nations drew attention to tbis perversive &velopmcnt of interstate trade in Euroae. but all to no c h . The world-wick
depression of the 'p's .brought matters to a head in most

-

-

countries, though differently in difiercnt cwntrits.
At this juncture appcartd Hitlcr and the Nazi dgimc. It
p
d to crate a "mark a m " of new design. I t originated
and expanded ingenious mahods of barter, based on clearing
funds. Minority pmurcs were cleverly conceded; pressure of
numkrs w s ostentatiously applied whcn ne~cssary.Gradually the trade of Germany with every c o w in Continad
Europt lxgan to show the c f h of German pcnmation, not
mmdy into a country but dso in intcrfuencc in the mtations
of foreign cwnuics with each other. It was perhaps the succcss
of the "commercial wolution" after the advent of Hitltr that
cnwuragd the Nazi party to undertake "military revolution"
disregard of the Tmty of Venailla, placing of t m p s on
the R h i n h d , fodcation of the border and expansion of
thc budding of airplanes. WeArstRafr and KricgsschIlfr were

-

joined.
What has happened since the onset of war is the fulfhlment
of undertaking cstablisbcd in the first five years of Nazi mle.
Germany has sought to b
e the "center of Europe" -and
the ratio of radius to drcumfuu~ceremains the same no matter how short or long the radius. Germany strive not for
quality but for rulership. Norway, h a r k , Haland, and
Begiwn are imprisoned physidy, exploited commcrciplly,
&gradad culturally and obliterated politically. (When asked
whether Germany would f e d the imprisoned populations, the
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with the question: since when has an invading
army been cxpaaed to f e d a country under oecupatian?)
As Oucrlmd-rat,Germans are to k entitled to the highest
standard of living ir Europe. Sweden and Switzerland arc
isolated wmmcrcidly and compdd to work for Germany
almost as much as the imprisoned muntries, with foreign
recognition of thcir indcptndencc r e d u d to a shadow. Spain
star~cswhile her would-be dictator chants tht mng of the
"new order." Italy has the shadow of greabut the sub
stance of deprivation. The Balkan states find themselves subordinated to a single market, that of Germany, and also draw
thcir imports only from Germany or with German consent
Everywhere is prtsslue on agriculture-to make Germany
directly or i n d i d y indepdcnt of supplies from overstas
and on de-iad~strialimtion~ in order to d c the Continent of Europe dependent m Gcnnan @ and strvias,
civilian and military. Such is the "new ordu." In protcst
against innumerable wars, idealists have often pr&
a
federation of Continental Europe; on the Wcstun Coast, from
Norway to Spain, the Nazis art making a dcmonstracion of
their model. France and Spain have hardly morc autonomy
than Narway and Holland.
In the "new order," from the btginning Germany has becn
invcntor and leader, Italy has followed ( v d d l y morc than
technically), Russia and Japan have become -rim,
while
the other nations of Western Europt from Norway to Spain
have been forced into conscription. The central region from
the Baltk to the Black Scar, the Danubian Area, has h
e
the Hintcdand of Germany (and Italy), with a forced exporting agricultum recipmting a forced impomtion of indupr
uid @,-inundated
with propaganda on the delight9 of
a b M small s ~ t in
a the "new ordu." Beyond Eur~pc,in
Asia and Africa, the countries arc re+
as fiefs; ahe stam
d the Western Hemisphere is "dtfcncd to IIlater date." With
her back to Russia, Gvmany is surrounded by fifteur countries which arc all to be subrdinated to the mnomic and
politid overlord in the cater. But anyone who hopes Russia
might attack Germany from behind lacks d i s m . OrMhrorrP
can only wme from within Gemmy, so far as mmincnd
Europe is concerned.
press replied
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Thc association of Stalin w a s inherent, but the stIcction of
time was dif6cult for the public to understand. A p s a l of
Max Eastman's b k Stdin's Ru~siawith the speeches of
Hitler and the issues of the official p m in Russia, will indiare that at all timer dificrence. were in words md not in
spirit. Incmldous, self-styled American liberals, who still try
to separate Hitler and Mussolini from Stalin, are urged to
m d in Eastman's h k the chapter rntided "Smtin Beats
Hider Twenty Ways." Gradually it has btcomc a parent that
Stalin, Hitlcr, and Murrolini wc long-lost b r J m laying
hide and seek; while in the modern industrial aatt o Japan,
mentalities amazingly similar to theirs have cvolvd from the
p i s t m a of oriental mysticism surrounding the Emperor.
Judged in five-year periods, the changes in Germany since
1 8 9 in her relations to other states of Europe, S a m in a ard n m e merely successive changes or misfomes, natural
enough. But when w e compares the present Nazi attitude in
all its ramifications with the frame of mind in Gcrrnany when
Bismarck retired, it may fairly be said that in no half century
of the modem world have deeper and more significant
changcs cwurred within a p p f c or over a people.

P

Gemm Public Sentiment

Finally Ihuc is h e quwtion of change in German sentiment
towards the outside world. From the conclusion of the FrancePmssian War to the outbreak of the Wodd War, Germany
lived iq confident anticipation of a promising future. Germany had b m c a unified country, in contrast to the centuryold division into numerous small states. German trade expanded over the globc. Students from every part df the wodd,
coming to Germany to study, carried back the influence of
German technical standards. The r a p t of the world for
Germany rose with every decade. G c m y had become a
world power; even with such exaggerations as Bcr1in-t~
Bagdad, the half century before the World War was one of
expanding cor~fidtnctin Germany and in her worth to the
world, by herself and by thc world.
Then came ddat in the World War and the Treaty of
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Vtrsailles. Marry of us who were in Gntrd Empe during
and following tbc World War, feared or believed that the
expulsion of the HOURof HohenzOlIcrn and the pardtion of

Austria-Hungary were mistakes in policy for which Europe
would some day pay a dreadful price. The late Professor
Archibald CmIidge of Harvard resided in Vienna for a considuabIe puiod after the WorId War, and the above state
ment represented his ok-t-repeatcdconviction, One of the faults
of the Tmty of Vusailles was that it created many small
stam, to the cconwnic disadvantage of Europe. In the '20's
Germany pas& through an "economic liquidation" in the
downward direaion, with repudiation of public and private
debt, distortion of rural and urban relations. In fact, Germany
in the 'ao's, though for d i I e m t reasons, y e d through some
such liquidation as America exptrienccd In the dtp&m of
the '30'3. Thtst and other factors served to prevent Germany
from working back to a normal-type peace, as did France
alter 1871.
It gradually &came dear that one of two things might
h a p p : either the German spirit wodd decIinc to the (earlier) level of a second-rank p p l e , or a "total German rrvolt" would in some way be organized. Either t h Germans
would lower their nationat self-respect €or a time, as they had
done before, or they wodd recover it in a violent and perversive form. Using a mixed metaphor, it might be said that
in the 'zo's, thc seeds of Hitler were planted and came to harvest in rhe '30'5 in the so-called Totalitarian Government of
National Socialism. The Nazi elite k a m e " b r e r s of a
higher ethic."
It was dl dong the ultimate intention of Russia to recover
the pieces of western territory removed from her in the
treaties following the World War; this was ammplirhtd by
semi-force in the recovery of Latvia, Litbuania, Esthonia, and
Bessarabia, and the larger part of what before the World War
was calted Congress Poland. It used to be said of AustriaHungary, that by the application of the old proverb "Di~idc
et impma,'' mi-IawJess regions in the political sense baeamc
mi-governed regions. But when the region was split into dis-

tad fragments (Bulgaria, Roumania, Yugoslavia, Czachm
slovakia, and Poland), with unmerited losses or gains of
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territory and consequent bittunas and impulst for revcngc,
this created a situation obviously made to ordcr €or a revived
and rotalimrian Germany. It is impossible to bclicve that thc
political policim of Hitler toward the East would have been
the same had Austria-Hungary lxen rerainad. There was an
cxaggcratd revolt in Germany against the menace of what
during the negotiation of p a c e in Paris was openly called the
"Cordon Miiitairc"; the creation of buffer states to the East,
cspecially Poland and Czechoslovakia, came to lx r r g d as
s "chain upon Germany.'* When Hitler coerced Czcchoslm
vakia, he bribed Poland to military compliance by giving her
a piece of territory stolen from Czechoslovakia, only to takt it
back by force a few months later.
In the reorganization of Gtrmany we may feel sure that the
attitude of the House of Hoheazol~cmwould have been different from the messianic attitude of the paper-hanger from
Austria ascended to dictatorship. In Germany, in contrast to
the pcaccful ambitions of the pre-World War ptriod, we now
have bitter, revengeful, terroristic ambitions of the Nazi dgime. Evcry act includes two considerations: first, to make
impsible the dcfeat (or quality) of Germany in any field,
tither military or economic, at any time in the future; and
the impulse to take not merely revenge and reprisal but multiplied revmgc and reprisal. This change from the famous
"GmrurlicR~cic"to 4 ' f u ~ tcut01~icus''
r
represents one of the
most extreme c h a p within a people during a half century
of history. The dreams of Russia, Japan, and the Axis Powers
are for enforced autarky in enlarged areas, under exploitation
and terror, T h e German change in this direction is more
marked than in the orher countries - a modem f e u d a b on
the grand scale, mechanistic and btumEzed. The Naziclite
arc cartel-batons and political overlords.

There is a strain of mysticism in Teutonic b l d , extending
into the Middle Ages; perhaps it originated in the wnquat
of Rome by thc Huns. Strange signs of this mysticism art to
bt noted in many placlp -in the writinga of Fichtc, HegcI
and Ninucbc, in thc views of Freduick the Gmt and Bir
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marck, in the compositions of Richard Wagner. In tk days
of scattered German states, it took thc form of the "dtstiny of
Prussia" to consolidate all Teutonic branches into Pan-Gcrmanism; between PanJavism and Pan-Germanism arc both
similarity and contrast. The cult of the Nibelungen in painting, sculpture, song, and story during the last century has
h of influence in this direction. The Nazi movement is
filled with suggestions of mystical origins. The word "FtiAm"
itsclf carries the meaning. The hypbthesis of "Nordic" culture and purity of blood-"Once
a German, always and
everywhere a German," The combination of mysticism and
ccnualized control of education of children represents to the
outside world a scrious situation; when a virile and highly
technical country teaches its children that they have an inborn
destiny to rule others, thereby is created an underlying impulse to continuous war, Since the Renaissance several conquerors, most notably Napoleon Bonaparte, dreamed of authority over Europe; but it remained for Hitler, with che
powers of thc industrial revolution, w plan a physical, racial,
and social hegemony to cover Europe west of Russia and north
of the Mediterranean -a new international order founded
an international anarchy. As Keith Feiling has put it, Hider
has rolled up the map of Europe, the M a p p Mondi.
Americans who have not lived abroad Iong enough and
often enough to appmiate the contrast between the Germany
of the present day and of the quarter century before the war,
will find suficient opportunity for okrvation in the contrast
baween the Germany and the United States of today. The
inhabitants of E u r o p n countries other than the Third Reich
have both contrasts before them-the difference between
Germany then and now and the current diffcrenfts bttwccn
Germany and the ofher counuies, some independent but
otkra under physical imprisonment or economic control. Five
years ago the highly developed small countries of Europt I*
prdcd themsdves in a senst as oases, favokd regions of
higher development; imprisonmcnt. enslavement and
nornic controI were inconceivable. Now four of these highly
developed countries arc territorially and physically imprisoned, the other two approach economic ~nslavernent,which will
gravitate toward territorial surrender. It is not now to be
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wandered at that the small European neighbors of the en-

larged Reich arc forced to fee1 that in the event of German
success in war it would lie within the power of Germany to
sprmd her system of governmat more or tcss ovtr the entire
world, certainly in the economic sense. The average American
stands at such a distance that he is in no position to apply personal mpcricnce to the question.
It is a common error to assume that immigrants into the
United Smm from any European country repicscntcd at any
cime a cross-xedon of the wrrulation of thc Emwan country.
lmmigracion from ~ u r o S&gI
not a mere indi&tion of Pr&sure ofpopulation on resources. The venturesome migrated-the n u g p , not the runcof-the-mine.It was mostly particular
and not generic. This holds true of the largesalt Germaa
immigration in the Iast half of the nineteenth century. In the
'50's came many C;crmans disgusted with the outcome of the
revoIution of 1848. With the o p i n g of the Great Plains
under the Homestead Act, many peasants from the sandy lowlands of North Germany tmk up virgin lands west of the
Mississippi. Sailors deserted German ships to m a i n in this
country; in the ' ~ ' smany m e to the Pacific Coast, to enter
into placer mining and timhring, often reverting to the seaman's life in the coastal trade. Since 1900 many agents and
clerks of German selling houses have mkm up citizenship; a
history of the dweioprntnt of chunical industr in this coun-

I

try will md how many chunists came to t is country in
order to take advantage of the beginnings of a new industry,
The descendants of these various types are even more diverse
than their forekrs. As a contrast, in Qucbae is a concentrated
French population which has d i d a t a d there for two
cuttwries: but nothing of that sort occurred in the case of
Gcman immigrants in this country, not even in the Uppr
Mississippi Valley, w h e the
~ population of German and Scandinavian immigrants was large.
T h e real question concerns perhaps not so much the
achieved technique of the totalitarian state as the p i b i l i t y
of continuation df thc main-spring. Thc main-spring of the
Nazi movement lics in controI of the education of children,
female as well as rnalc-the inculcation of the spirit of sacrifice for the sake of hc "destiny" of the "super-nation." So
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long as opponents of Germany recognize faIlibility whtrtas
Germans inculcate infallibility, the advantage of the struggle
for the time being lies on the side of the Nazi movement. The
impling revolurionary forces of Germany in the '30's arose
from frustration of ambition, disillusion, disarganization of
economy, desire for revenge, and medieval superstition incorporated in adoration of the Nordic. Whether succcssivc
generations of children can be kept in line for the "new order"
represents the qucstian-mark of the future. O n the continua[ion of fanaticism in the German youth, or recovery of the
traditional toleration, depends the intensity and duration of
the totalitarian combat against other £oms of government in
the world, Under current Hirlerian psychology, even a Pax
Germokra would contain no Pax. brier or later -after war
if not during war the German mentality of today will have
to square itself with the German mentality of a half century
:go. "By clever, persistent propaganda," Hitler has remarked,
even heaven can be represented to a people as hell, and the
most wretched life as paradise." Germany must some day
disprove his. Three aIternatives arc possible: ( a ) restoration
ofindependent stacts in Europe, ( 6 ) European Federation, or
( c ) hegemony under Germany by force. Equality may be
sought in the first two. The last means supremacy by Germany
and subordination of all others.
Freedom must br earned within, it cannot be i m p i d from
without. External freedom is the response to internal, spiritual
emancipation. Times change; before the industrial revolution,
the hegemony of Germany in Europe would have meant
largely external relations; now it would mean a tramformation of E u r o p n society,--to the innermost cdls and fibres.
The imprisoned countries illustrate what is implied in Nazi
control of Europ. Germany might succumb to ttchnica! collapse, w newly acquired superiority of mechanisms or economic isolation. But an endurin pee must indude
within Germany, the recovery o the spirit of quality and
rejection of the ambition of dictatorship. Only Germans can
recaptw the lm soul of Germany.
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